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Abstract
Evidence-based medicine has been the subject of much controversy within and outside the field of medicine, with its detrac-
tors characterizing it as reductionist and authoritarian, and its proponents rejecting such characterization as a caricature of 
the actual practice. At the heart of this controversy is a complex linguistic and social process that cannot be illuminated by 
appealing to the semantics of the modifier evidence-based. The complexity lies in the nature of evidence as a basic con-
cept that circulates in both expert and non-expert spheres of communication, supports different interpretations in different 
contexts, and is inherently open to contestation. We outline a new methodology that combines a social epistemological per-
spective with advanced methods of corpus linguistics and elements of conceptual history to investigate this and other basic 
concepts that underpin the practice and ethos of modern medicine. The potential of this methodology to offer new insights 
into controversies such as those surrounding EBM is demonstrated through a case study of the various meanings supported 
by evidence and based, as attested in a large electronic corpus of online material written by non-experts as well as a variety 
of experts in different fields, including medicine.
Keywords Evidence-based medicine · Corpora · Basic concept · Social epistemology · Evidence
Introduction
Ever since the rise of modern medical science in the early 
nineteenth century, medical practice has been closely associ-
ated with science and research, and evidence has grown to 
become a key term in modern medical discourse. This has 
been particularly true since the emergence of the evidence-
based medicine (EBM) movement in the early 1990s. The 
basic idea in EBM is that clinical and health policy decisions 
should not be based merely on intuition, expert opinion, or 
pathophysiological reasoning. Such sources are considered 
potentially biased and unreliable. Evidence-based decisions 
should integrate expertise and patient preferences with the 
“best available external evidence from systematic research” 
(Sackett et al. 1996, 71: 78). Evidence, in the EBM sense of 
the word, is mainly associated with randomized controlled 
trials (RCTs), i.e. comparative experimental intervention 
studies, which are considered the ‘gold standard’ for assess-
ing cause-effect relationships between an intervention and 
its outcome; the findings generated by RCTs are likely to be 
closer to the true effect than the findings generated by other 
research methods (Evans 2003). Ideally, such trials should be 
summarized through systematic reviews and form the basis 
for clinical guidelines for clinicians and decision makers 
following standardized procedures. Other research designs 
such as observational studies and even qualitative studies are 
officially included in the EMB framework, but in practice are 
treated as less reliable sources of evidence. Indeed, EBM has 
developed a framework for ranking evidence in a hierarchy 
that features simple observational methods at the bottom and 
moves on to increasingly rigorous methodologies, notably 
RCTs and systematic reviews, at the top.
This received ranking of evidence and the singular, 
restricted conceptualization of evidence it perpetuates are 
not always helpful, as the current crisis has amply illustrated. 
For instance, Greenhalgh (2020) has recently demonstrated 
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that EBM fails to acknowledge the whole fabric of evidence 
relevant to the question of using facemasks as a measure 
against the spread of COVID-19. Although there are few 
relevant RCTs to warrant decisions on this issue, several 
other pertinent strands of evidence are available. Along 
with epidemiological studies, Greenhalgh (2020) refers to 
the physics of droplets and aerosols, the material science of 
masks, mathematical modelling, political and behavioural 
science, economics, and anthropology in order to answer 
various questions regarding the use of facemasks. In addi-
tion, she draws on semi-scientific sources such as hand-
books, newspaper articles and patient experiences. These 
can all be considered sources of different types of evidence, 
she claims—although they address different purposes. An 
anthropological study about cultural attitudes or compliance 
does not measure the ‘true effects’ or statistical magnitude 
of an intervention, but that does not make its findings unreli-
able as evidence in every sense of the word. They provide 
evidence of a different kind.
The same argument may be extended to what constitutes 
evidence for non-academic groups, including groups that 
question and challenge conventional medicine. Anti-vaccine 
groups and various proponents of alternative medicine have 
contested the meanings and uses of evidence and associated 
concepts in EBM, partly in response to what they perceive 
as the hierarchical, authoritarian and impersonal character of 
the medical community (Browne 2018). These groups sup-
port their views through various practices of evidence, and 
many of them draw on knowledge sources associated with 
traditional academic institutions. EBM cannot understand 
the motivations of those promoting anti-vaccination theo-
ries if it simply dismisses their arguments as non-evidence. 
Without suggesting that the alternative basis of evidence 
these groups promote must be accepted, there is a need to 
identify and analyse the discursive means by which they 
support their claim to scientific legitimacy (Kata 2012). 
By understanding what concept of evidence informs their 
behaviour, the arguments put forward by these groups can be 
better addressed and questioned, and, where necessary, mis-
information can be targeted by effective counter-information.
This article is a plea for initiating a new research strand 
within the medical humanities that combines advanced 
methods in corpus linguistics and critical discourse analy-
sis with some of the assumptions of social epistemology 
and conceptual history in order to address two main aims. 
The first is to investigate the genealogy and contestation of 
a constellation of concepts that has underpinned the practice 
and ethos of modern medicine since the early nineteenth 
century. This requires access to a large body of electronic 
corpora of texts originating at different historical moments 
and drawn from a diverse range of genres, including medical 
journal articles, WHO and CDC reports, systematic reviews, 
guidelines and internet blogs. To demonstrate the potential 
of the proposed methodology in the absence of access to 
these resources, which we are planning to build and share 
with the research community in the near future, we will here 
present a case study exploring the variety and complexity of 
meanings currently associated with the concept of evidence-
based in modern medicine, as well as the various forms of 
contestation it has invited within and beyond the medical 
community. We attempt to unpack this complex concept by 
analysing the patterning of its individual components (evi-
dence and based), as attested in the Genealogies of Knowl-
edge corpus of Internet English (see “Data, methods and 
theoretical underpinnings” section).
The second aim of our research group is to develop 
models for situated epistemologies and ontologies able to 
cope with the huge challenges to established frameworks of 
knowledge in modern medicine that the COVID-19 crisis 
has particularly thrown into relief in recent months. This is 
a more ambitious aim which we hope to pursue through a 
series of future case studies. For our immediate purposes, 
we focus mostly on demonstrating our proposed methodol-
ogy and contributing to the (limited) literature on the mean-
ings of evidence-based as a key concept in modern medicine 
and a growing range of other areas of practice (“Analysis” 
section).
Data, methods and theoretical 
underpinnings
This article supports its plea for a new research strand in 
the medical humanities with a small case study of the lin-
guistic patterning of evidence-based in a corpus of Internet 
English, and what this patterning reveals about the potential 
for this widely used term to generate different meanings in 
different contexts, in part because of the numerous meanings 
supported by each of its constituent elements (evidence and 
based). The analysis is rooted in the theoretical assump-
tions and draws primarily on the methodological innova-
tions of two areas of scholarship: corpus linguistics (CL) 
and critical discourse analysis (CDA). Both insist on the 
primacy of attested uses of language, focus on identifying 
repeated patterns, and offer generalizations based on close 
analysis of such patterns. Corpus linguistics offers theoreti-
cal notions that assist in the analysis of the semantic and 
affective dimensions of key concepts such as evidence and 
evidence-based, as revealed in actual use across many texts, 
authors and historical periods, depending on the design of 
the corpora to which the analyst has access. These include, 
for example, the notion of collocation (the habitual co-
occurrence of words), semantic preference (the tendency of 
a certain word to collocate with other words from a specific 
semantic set), and semantic prosody (collocational patterns 
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that express the speaker or writer’s attitude or evaluation) 
(Sinclair 1991; Louw 2000).
Influenced by the work of Michel Foucault, CDA seeks to 
explain the conditions of possibility for the recurrent use of 
particular linguistic patterns by examining the social prac-
tices and ideological context in which they are embedded. 
CDA assumes that any discursive event is shaped by the 
institutions and social structures in which it is embedded but 
also shapes them; in other words, that “discourse is socially 
constitutive as well as socially conditioned” (Wodak and 
Fairclough 1997, p. 258). Corpus-based CDA integrates 
the two theoretical traditions to arrive at more holistic and 
detailed descriptions of a large body of data rather than lim-
ited samples of language in use, while maintaining the focus 
on discourse as constitutive of social relations. By combin-
ing large scale quantitative and qualitative analyses of lan-
guage in use, Corpus-based CDA avoids the overemphasis 
on statistical methods typical of many corpus linguistic stud-
ies, including the very few that have recently been conducted 
in the field of medicine (Aiello and Simeone 2019). The 
emphasis on discourse as ‘structured forms of knowledge’ 
rather than text as a linguistic artefact means that Corpus-
based CDA studies typically supplement statistical analy-
ses with close examination of extended stretches of text, a 
methodology that is more consistent with the tenets of social 
epistemology and the objectives of the strand of research we 
advocate here.1
Work in Corpus-based CDA generally focuses on the 
ideological implications of linguistic patterns associated 
with lexical items such as migrants or climate change in the 
media (Baker et al. 2008), or metaphorical uses of language 
in specific sites of communication (Wei 2016). In the field 
of healthcare and education, Semino et al. (2015) explore 
the use of metaphors of Violence and Journey among cancer 
patients and health professionals on online forums, and Cle-
land and Palma (2018) examine the discourse of UK deans 
of medical schools, arguing that it leads to the othering of 
widening participation applicants and exacerbates social 
divides. Our proposed methodology goes beyond this type 
of analysis in one important respect.2 It focuses not on lexi-
cal items or metaphors but on basic concepts, as defined and 
understood in the field of conceptual history. Basic concepts 
have considerable currency in both specialist and public dis-
course. They “combine manifold experiences and expecta-
tions in such a way that they become indispensable to any 
formulation of the most urgent issues of a given time”, and 
“are always both controversial and contested” (Koselleck 
1996, p. 64). Precisely because of these characteristics, they 
are “pivots around which all arguments turn”, and their his-
tory cannot be separated from the history of discourse, in 
Foucault’s sense of the term (ibid.:65). Given the entan-
glement of their scientific and public meanings and uses, 
a study of a basic concept such as evidence in medicine, 
for example, cannot be separated from its study in every-
day, non-specialist use, nor can it be restricted to a specific 
genre or register. Our focus on basic concepts and constel-
lations of concepts rather than lexical items or metaphors 
requires compiling thematic corpora that cut across many 
genres rather than, for instance, corpora solely constituted 
of newspaper articles or case reports.
Finally, the research approach suggested in this paper is 
theoretically situated within the broad and rather ambiguous 
tradition of social epistemology. This branch of epistemol-
ogy was systematically developed by Steve Fuller in the late 
1980s but was first conceptualized by the library scientist 
Jesse Shera, who defined it as “the study of knowledge in 
society” and suggested that its focus “should be upon the 
production, flow, integration, and consumption of all forms 
of communicated thought throughout the entire social fab-
ric” (Shera 1970, p. 86). Social epistemology later took two 
divergent directions. According to one of its pioneers, Alan 
Goldman, social epistemology should maintain the truth-
oriented ambition of traditional epistemology, but with an 
emphasis on collective agents, rather than individual agents: 
“social epistemology is, in the first instance, an enterprise 
concerned with how people can best pursue the truth […] 
with the help of, or in the face of, others” (Goldman and 
O’Connor 2019, p. 1). Fuller favours a different program 
that is more inspired by science and technology studies and 
a social constructionist perspective on knowledge, and based 
on “the assumption that a key feature of a claim’s episte-
mological status is its need to be certified by an appropri-
ate social group before passing as knowledge”, as stated in 
the announcement of his new journal Social Epistemology 
in 1987. In this latter version, and as originally defined by 
Shera, social epistemology underpins the following four 
dimensions of our approach to the study of evidence, which 
are consistent with our focus on basic concepts as outlined 
above:
1. When exploring the concept of evidence, we are not only 
concerned with science but with the whole social body 
of knowledge.
1 In CDA and beyond, criticism of corpus-based research generally 
focuses on the disproportionate attention paid to single words and 
phrases rather than larger textual units, and on the difficulty of con-
vincingly relating textual patterns to extra-textual realities. In addition 
to linguistic and cultural decontextualization, the proper use of quan-
tification and visualisation techniques is heavily debated. Taylor and 
Marchi (2018) offer a constructive overview of abiding methodologi-
cal issues.
2 It also goes beyond some of the corpus-based studies in the phi-
losophy of science that focus on differences in writing styles between 
historical and experimental sciences (Argamon et al. 2005; Argamon 
and Dodick 2006).
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2. We consider knowledge not merely as an individual but 
primarily as a social endeavour involving the whole 
social fabric.
3. We consider the epistemological questions of what can 
be known and how knowledge claims can be assessed 
as relative to the social processes in which the knowl-
edge is produced. This is not the same as arguing that all 
knowledge is equally true; our argument, rather, is that 
truth is only one of the situated principles according to 
which knowledge claims are or can be assessed.
4. We approach the study of evidence from an empirical 
point of view by analysing and assessing how the con-
cept is actually used in various discourses. As such, our 
approach relates to recent developments in the field of 
experimental medical philosophy, which share the over-
all ambition of promoting empirical methods within phi-
losophy and the assumption that conceptual analysis can 
be informed by empirical data (Veit 2020). However, 
while our approach is empirical it is not bound to any 
experimental method, and where experimental philoso-
phy has mostly used surveys, our study rather draws on 
corpus linguistics and conceptual history.
Combining this social epistemological perspective with 
corpus linguistics and elements of conceptual history, we 
argue that the concept of evidence should not be studied 
solely in the restricted environments that lay claim to a 
specific notion of it. Evidence can only be understood and 
assessed within the diverse discursive environments in 
which the concept actually operates.
The data on which the analysis offered in “Analysis” sec-
tion is based consists of the full Genealogies of Knowledge 
(GoK) corpus of Internet English. GoK is a multidiscipli-
nary research project that has built corpora of ancient Greek, 
Latin, medieval Arabic and modern English. Each of these 
languages has served, at a particular point in time, as a lin-
gua franca governing the intercultural circulation of knowl-
edge. In the GoK browser environment, these corpora are 
queried separately, but their content is connected via trans-
lation and other forms of mediation, and thematically the 
corpora are all constructed around broad notions of scientific 
and political discourse. In other words, all texts contained 
in the corpora have contributed to our contemporary con-
ceptual apparatus for expressing notions such as expertise, 
proof, and evidence, but also justice, rights, or democracy. 
For the English language, the corpus is divided into two 
main subcorpora. One corpus represents canonical academic 
knowledge, usually published in book form, whereas the 
other corpus represents a wide variety of publications gath-
ered from the Internet, more specifically from media seeking 
to give voice to multiple opinions that contest the political 
and scientific consensus arguably found in traditional print 
and broadcast media. The texts in the GoK Internet corpus 
consist mostly of short articles and blog posts written from 
a polemic or activist perspective, published within the last 
15 years. This corpus (totalling 5.6 million tokens) provides 
all data discussed below and includes a total of 3476 texts 
from over 35 outlets, including ScienceBlogs, Discover Soci-
ety, openDemocracy, and UCSUSA (Union of Concerned 
Scientists).3 All texts are written in the English language, 
and the corpus is not meant to provide a representative over-
view of ‘the Internet’—something that would be impossible 
to attain. Rather, it provides a broad sample of Anglophone 
voices represented in online alternative media. The corpora 
compiled in the context of the GoK project are queried via 
a freely accessible concordance browser.4 The main inter-
face is a classic keyword-in-context (KWIC) display, which 
returns concordance lines in response to a search for a given 
keyword; longer stretches of text are viewed by means of an 
‘extract’ function, designed in compliance with copyright 
regulations (Fig. 1). In addition to the concordance interface, 
the software also offers a range of visualization tools (Luz 
and Sheehan 2020), some of which feature in the analysis 
we present here.
Analysis
In assessing the controversy around the adequacy of EBM, 
Martini (2020) asserts that disagreement partly results from 
“ambiguity about the concept of evidence”, which often 
goes largely “unanalysed” and therefore “contains the con-
tradictions that allow both camps to defend their positions 
and charge their adversaries”. Similar concerns about the 
lack of critical reflection on the meanings of evidence and 
evidence-based have been raised in relation to other areas 
of evidence-based practice, where analogous controversies 
have arisen. For instance, Kvernbekk (2011, p. 515) notes 
that evidence-based has become “a buzzword in contempo-
rary educational debates (and also in medicine and policy-
making, among other areas)”, and resorts to philosophy to 
unpack the meanings of the two components of the term, 
namely evidence and based. Rather than pursue this dis-
cussion in the realm of philosophical debate, our proposed 
methodology involves analysing attested uses of the two 
concepts that feed into different interpretations of evidence-
based medicine—evidence and based—in a large electronic 
corpus of texts written by non-specialists using evidence, 
-based, and evidence-based in arguments about everyday 
3 The full contents the corpus can be consulted at http:// genea logie 
sofkn owled ge. net/ corpo ra/ inter net- corpus/. Corpus building is still 
ongoing, but upon request the authors can provide a list of all articles 
included at the time of writing.
4 http:// genea logie sofkn owled ge. net/ softw are/.
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topics such as climate change and human rights, as well 
as specialists on various areas of Evidence-based Practice, 
including EBM. Understanding the variety of meanings that 
basic concepts such as evidence assume in general discourse 
and in different contexts may afford us some insight into 
how they came to be condensed and streamlined to support 
a specific conception of medical practice associated with 
the EBM model and dominant among some, though by no 
means all members of the medical community.
Evidence in the GoK Internet corpus
In the GoK Internet corpus, there are 4402 occurrences of 
the keyword evidence, placing this basic concept in a very 
high (118th) position in the general frequency list. Evidence 
occurs with higher frequency in the corpus than lexical items 
that are very common throughout the English language, such 
as same and since, and is also more frequent than many 
other terms that encode basic concepts characteristic of our 
thematically designed corpus, such as policy and society. At 
N − 1, the position one word to the left of the keyword, the 
most frequent collocates are the (719), of (359) and no (229). 
The and of are the two most frequent words in the overall 
corpus, so their high frequency in relation to evidence is not 
immediately informative. In contrast, no generally occurs 
much less frequently, and thus the pair no evidence makes 
for an interesting collocation, as can be seen in Fig. 2.
Fig. 1  Example screenshot of a KWIC concordance of evidence from the GoK interface, ordered by the lexical item in position 1 to the left of 
the keyword
Fig. 2  Mosaic of evidence 
collocates in the GoK Internet 
Corpus (cropped). The size of 
the tiles is relative to the words’ 
collocation strength, calculated 
using the MI3 measure (a vari-
ant of Mutual Information less 
biased towards rare words), 
omitting log transformation. 
Local view is selected within 
the interface, meaning that 
significance is represented 
within each position to the left 
or right of the keyword, rather 
than across all positions (global 
view). See Luz and Sheehan 
(2020, pp. 11–12) for a broader 
discussion of the visualization 
tool
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Many instances of the collocation no evidence form part 
of the larger pattern no evidence of (64), a phrase that in 
turn occurs in several longer sequences, as in the following 
examples:
There is no evidence of a link between autisms and 
vaccines. (Hoofnagle and Hoofnagle 2008; Denialism 
Blog)
There is no evidence of a link between glyphosate in 
the food chain and autism, diabetes and obesity. (Zaruk 
2016; The Risk Monger)
Both examples are taken from individual blogs concerned 
with a broad range of scientific matters, yet remarkably, the 
same exact phrasing occurs twice 8 years apart, and both 
times in an argument against purported connections between 
chemicals and health disorders. The first example speaks of 
a supposed link between autism and vaccination, and while 
no relevant causality has been established in the medical 
literature, belief in this relation seems to have only grown 
over the past decade and developed among large parts of 
the global population into a general aversion to vaccination. 
Indeed, while there are currently several vaccines avail-
able for COVID-19, this does not necessarily mean that the 
problem of ‘vaccine hesitancy’ is easily overcome (Harrison 
and Wu 2020). A central problem in this regard is that it 
may be feasible in the short term to provide evidence for the 
efficacy of a vaccine, but it is much harder to establish its 
safety. Indeed, variants of the common expression ‘absence 
of evidence is not evidence of absence’ occur several times 
in the corpus. The expression illustrates a logic on which 
the sceptic can always fall back when defending a suspi-
cious position in relation to the long-term health effects of 
vaccines, or to any other hypothetical consequence of multi-
faceted bodily or social interventions.
The second example intervenes in the glyphosate con-
troversy, the debate about whether the use of this herbicide 
is harmful to humans. Glyphosate is domestically known 
for being the main active ingredient in Roundup, but is also 
used on a vast scale in agriculture. Studies on its effects are 
so far inconclusive. Chemical interactions produce complex 
effects, and while studies declaring the herbicide safe are 
often considered questionable for being produced by com-
mercial stakeholders, several studies condemning the use 
of glyphosate are criticized for being “unsupported by evi-
dence” (Mesnage and Antoniou 2017, p. 4). In this respect, 
providing evidence would mean incontestably showing that 
glyphosate in the environment causes disease. However, pro-
ponents of a stricter regulation of pesticide and herbicide use 
regularly invoke the “precautionary principle”: when in a 
state of “scientific uncertainty”, do not take risks (Kudsk and 
Mathiassen 2020, p. 216). The argument cannot easily be 
resolved, as both sides come to rely on the rhetorical fallacy 
termed argumentum ad ignorantiam (Walton 1999). Those 
critical of glyphosate argue that, since there is no proof of 
safety, the chemical is unsafe, whereas their opponents, in 
the absence of proven harmful effects, declare the herbicide 
safe. Thus, the burden of proof is passed back and forth, 
and a consensus cannot be reached. Consequently, further 
oppositional entrenchment can be expected, and notably, 
both articles from which the above examples are derived 
ultimately resort to name-calling: Hoofnagle and Hoofnagle 
(2008) frame the discourse of their opponents as “denialist 
claptrap”, and Zaruk (2016) seeks to confront what he calls 
“chemophobic propaganda”. Thus, the dichotomy estab-
lished by the common pattern no evidence is indicative of 
a potential deadlock in scientific argumentation. If the idea 
of evidence requires absolute verifiability, its scope shrinks 
considerably. The fact that the collocates with evidence is 
also informative in this regard. The definite article, in con-
trast to the zero marker, implies certainty and singularity. 
Evidence suggests is not as forceful and monolithic as the 
evidence suggests, a phrase the high frequency of which sig-
nals, like no evidence, that the concept of evidence is often 
invoked when dealing in absolutes. One may also note, in 
this respect, a purported equivalence between science and 
evidence in parallel expressions of absolute certainty, as in 
the corpus examples the science is clear (7 instances) and 
the evidence is clear (9).
Other common collocates of evidence sketch a more 
nuanced picture, not restricted to the yes–no or pre-
sent–absent binary: there can be much (17 instances) or 
enough (17) evidence, but also insufficient (17) or little (38) 
of it. The fact that the quantifiers expressing sufficiency are 
often negated, as in not much evidence or not enough evi-
dence, while the main negative ones tend not to be reversed, 
suggests that the quantification of evidence in most cases 
implies that it falls short of confirming or supporting a given 
claim (Fig. 3).
Not only can evidence be quantified, but it can also be 
qualified in a variety of ways: fossil evidence (22) identifies 
a particular object of study, whereas empirical evidence (38) 
identifies a certain method of observation. New evidence 
(51) is uncovered in relation to earlier information on the 
same topic, and supporting evidence (11) is expected to 
back up claims to truth. An interesting category of quali-
fying adjectives concerns the specification of an affective 
response, as in compelling (29) and convincing evidence 
(13). Convincing is often modified by negation, as in no 
convincing evidence, whereas compelling and other inten-
sifying qualifiers such as ample (14) and damning (7) are 
usually employed affirmatively, as in:
There is compelling evidence that children’s percep-
tions of cigarettes are influenced by branding and that 
branding detracts from the impact of health warnings 
on packs. (Abbott 2013; Left Foot Forward)
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Note that the indefinite ‘there is’ does not specify where 
the evidence originates. While such specification may occur 
elsewhere in the article, a more impactful omission is that 
of the supposedly compelled subject—in the absence of a 
subject, the qualification of the evidence as compelling is 
presented as an objective characteristic, thus fabricating a 
tacit agreement between the author, their sources, and the 
implied reader. The implication is that the evidence ‘speaks 
for itself’. The representation of actors and participants is a 
central issue in critical discourse analysis (e.g. van Leeuwen 
2008, pp. 23–54). In scientific as well as political reports, 
the responsibility of human agents is often elided, while 
“agency is shifted to abstract processes and entities” (Fair-
clough 2003, p. 138). In this regard, it is also important to 
take stock of the verbs of persuasion commonly found at the 
N + 1 position of evidence: the evidence shows (40), indi-
cates (15) and supports (11). Together, these two patterns 
(the absence of a subject and the proliferation of verbs of 
persuasion in position N + 1) suggest that perspectives and 
positions are seemingly automatically validated by the pres-
ence of evidence, with no need for a human mediator to be 
specified as the agent responsible for interpreting the infor-
mation at hand. The most common collocate on the right-
hand side of evidence, namely suggests (59), forms part of 
this widespread grammatical pattern. Often, the broader 
pattern includes strong markers of emphasis that reinstate 
the yes–no dichotomy at the far ends of quantification: there 
are several variants of all the evidence suggests as well as 
no evidence suggests. In these cases, too, the majority of 
instances do not specify potentially relevant participants in 
the situation of evidence assessment.5
Rhetorically charged quantifications and qualifications 
such as abundant and compelling frequently precede evi-
dence, but by far the most common qualifier modifying 
evidence is the seemingly more neutral adjective scientific 
(197). What exactly makes evidence scientific is seldom 
specified, but in some cases a number of expected charac-
teristics are explicated:
This is the first scientific evidence, published in Envi-
ronmental Research Letters, that confirms the numer-
ous anecdotal accounts. (Albert et al. 2016; Desmog)
Here, scientific evidence is partly defined by the com-
municative setting: an academic outlet is required to present 
it, and it is contrasted to anecdotal accounts. The latter con-
trast implies, once again, demands of quantity and quality, 
as anecdotal evidence (14 instances) is generally understood 
to be gathered unsystematically and in limited amounts. Fur-
thermore, anecdotes are told rather than observed, meaning 
that the scientific mode is presented in opposition to the 
narrative mode of exposition. While such schemas can in 
some cases be derived from the concordance lines, often the 
collocation scientific evidence is simply used as a means of 
emphasis, as further illustrated by the fact that the colloca-
tion is frequently preceded by additional adjectives of per-
suasion. Indeed, the most frequent pattern associated with 
scientific evidence is overwhelming scientific evidence (10 
occurrences). Overwhelming encodes a rhetorical mixture of 
quantity and suggested affective response, and thus a merger 
of the features of adjectives such as much and compelling, 
discussed earlier. In addition, the phrase overwhelming sci-
entific evidence is in the majority of cases used to set up a 
contrast, as in:
Despite the overwhelming scientific evidence linking 
fine soot particles to premature death, Honeycutt testi-
Fig. 3  Concordance tree showing patterns preceding much evidence 
in the GoK Internet Corpus (cropped). Left co-text is shown. More 
common patterns are displayed in larger font. They include direct 
negation of sufficient quantity via the adverb not; more extended 
examples include ‘don’t provide’ and ‘neither side has managed to 
produce’. See Luz and Sheehan (2020, pp. 11, 13) for more informa-
tion on the visualization tool
5 A notable exception to this overall tendency is the pattern of appro-
priation our evidence suggests (6 instances). This pattern partly inti-
mates the revelatory quality of investigative journalism, but it also 
strongly suggests institutional ownership—an undifferentiated inter-
net search for our evidence will mostly return information from large 
health-related research bodies such as Cochrane and BMJ.
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fied before Congress that “some studies even suggest 
PM makes you live longer.” (Negin 2017; UCSUSA)
Collocational patterns do not merely report a state of 
affairs; they express a communicative purpose which is of 
pragmatic rather than semantic importance (Stubbs 2009, 
pp. 124–125). In other words, recurrent phrases are likely 
to have an attitudinal or evaluative function that extends 
beyond their constative value. This function is termed 
semantic prosody in corpus linguistics, and in the case of 
the contrastive pattern despite the overwhelming scientific 
evidence, which occurs three times in the corpus, the func-
tion is not primarily to qualify the evidence in question but 
to suggest that one should be surprised at the existence of an 
opinion opposed to the author’s. Arguably, the various pat-
terns of linguistic modification characteristic of evidence do 
not merely, or even primarily, serve to affirm, negate, qualify 
or quantify, but mainly to convince the implied reader of a 
given stance by rhetorical measures that conflate persuasive 
and epistemic modes of expression.
Importantly for our overall argument in this paper, when 
the GoK corpus is narrowed down to include only texts that 
make explicit mention of evidence-based medicine, the over-
all collocational patterns associated with evidence remain 
largely unchanged. Thus, the use of rhetorical adjectives 
such as compelling and overwhelming is not restricted to 
discussions outside the disciplinary scope of EBM, and this 
broad rhetorical inflection indicates that common discursive 
patterns of persuasion are shared across varied settings of 
practice. The boundaries of different spheres of knowledge 
production are porous, and basic concepts that display highly 
frequent patterns of usage alongside more specialist applica-
tions are particularly likely to generate heated disagreements 
through mutual misunderstanding. In the following section, 
we show how the meaning of -based is as elusive as that 
of evidence, further contributing to the fact that, while the 
concept of evidence-based medicine may purportedly apply 
to a restricted set of principles operational within a circum-
scribed context, this does not mean that it is necessarily 
presented and understood as such by different interlocutors.
Based in the GoK Internet corpus
One of the central arguments put forward by corpus lin-
guists is that meaning does not reside in individual words, 
but is realised in extended lexical elements. This means, 
as already shown in the previous section, that evidence 
has to be examined in its context of use. It also means that 
seemingly secondary elements, such as based, are bound to 
contribute heavily to the reception and interpretation of the 
concept and practice of evidence-based medicine. A search 
for based in the GoK Internet corpus returns 2891 concord-
ance lines. Based is a multi-faceted lexical element that can 
fulfil a number of distinct linguistic functions. In order to 
focus on usages that structurally correspond to the phrase 
evidence-based medicine, we limit our analysis to its occur-
rence as part of a hyphenated compound adjective (as in 
evidence-based), rather than as a verb (as in based on evi-
dence). However, the two variants are often closely related, 
and where relevant attested verbal uses will contribute to 
the argument.
For compound adjectives containing based, the Oxford 
English Dictionary (OED 2020) lists four main uses. A 
first common use indicates a relation to a specific location, 
as in London-based (36 instances) or UK-based (33). As 
these examples illustrate, such locations tend to be nations 
or cities. A second general use indicates a relation to a 
particular material, often described in chemical terms, and 
exemplified in the corpus by compounds such as carbon-
based (10) and chlorine-based (1). The OED (2020) lists 
as a third option the use of based to indicate “a foundation, 
fundamental principle, or underlying basis”. This is by far 
the most frequent use in the corpus, not only because of the 
high frequency of evidence-based (218) and science-based 
(95), but also because of the widespread use of based in 
relation to social categorizations, as in class-based (36), 
community-based (30), or faith-based (25). The final main 
use listed by the OED concerns a specification of the base 
in question, as in broad-based (20). The fact that instances 
of all main categories of use can be easily retrieved from 
the concordance output suggests that the corpus provides 
an adequate general overview of the variety of meanings 
expressed by based.
The meaning of based cannot always be intuitively 
grasped by restricting one’s view to the various compounds 
in which it occurs, given that these compounds themselves 
form an adjectival unit that typically modifies a noun that 
follows. The co-text to the right of the compound has to 
be taken into account to arrive at an interpretation. A first 
observation is that when the adjectival compound itself 
contains a concrete material substance, the full phrase may 
still establish an abstract relation, as in oil-based economy 
(1) or carbon-based capitalism (1). The meaning of based 
is not equivalent in carbon-based capitalism and carbon-
based vegetation (1), with the former expressing a relation 
of dependency and the latter one of composition. Thus, 
the interpretation of each adjective remains highly context 
dependent. An observation related to this tendency towards 
the abstract commonly expressed by based is the adjective’s 
frequent involvement in the description of large, intangible 
systems, which may be more or less regulated. The words 
system and systems immediately follow based fifteen times, 
and more specific examples of systems attested in this posi-
tion include taxation (7), politics (8) and organi[zs]ation(s) 
(17). Social systems are composed of regular patterns of 
practice, and there is a marked tendency in the corpus for 
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adjectival compounds containing based to be followed by 
nominal compounds containing making, such as rulemaking 
(follows based 7 times), policymaking (19) and decision-
making (16, counts include hyphenated and unhyphenated 
spelling variants). This is a strong collocational pattern, 
as the gerundial form making seldom occurs in the corpus 
without the preceding words policy or decision. In fact, the 
expression evidence-based decision-making has become so 
cliché that, as the following example from our corpus indi-
cates, it can be toyed with for humorous purposes:
Tom Slater has written that in order to give ‘scientific’ 
credibility to extending the neo-liberal state and deep-
ening social inequality, think-tanks such as the CSJ 
have “mastered the craft of decision-based evidence 
making, tailored to the needs of policy elites and poli-
ticians on the lookout for accessible catchphrases to 
woo a jaded electorate.” (Silver et al. 2014; Discover 
Society)
Typically, nouns referring to the outcome of regulatory 
procedures such as policymaking can also follow based; 
there are, for instance, no fewer than 55 occurrences of 
policy or policies immediately following based, the bulk 
of which are part of the larger pattern evidence-based pol-
icy and science-based policy. Alternatives to policy that 
occur within similar patterns include approach(es) (21) 
and practice(s) (8). Thus, based very frequently, and often 
quite explicitly, functions to express the relation between a 
productive field of practice and the principles that guide it. 
This interpretation also holds for evidence-based medicine, 
yet what linguistically separates this particular phrase from 
its more general variants is the frequent use of an acronym, 
namely EBM (38 occurrences across several articles). There 
is, for instance, no acronym EBA, which could hypotheti-
cally refer to evidence-based approaches. The acronym EBP 
occurs only 17 times in the corpus, and its use is restricted 
to a single article (in which the P stands for policy, while 
outside the corpus the same abbreviation will often refer 
to practice). The use of acronyms is extremely common in 
scientific writing across various disciplines, even though in 
the health sciences it has been criticised as a source of “irri-
tation, misunderstanding, and even alienation” (Moris 2020, 
p. 1274). Even writers who are seemingly well-acquainted 
with the vocabulary involved may produce formulations that 
suggest a lack of transparency, as the following example 
from the corpus illustrates:
One example is the implementation of a new proce-
dure to treat asthma at the Royal Children’s Hospital 
in Victoria, Australia. The EBM-based approach 
was able to achieve an unusually high success rate of 
95.5 percent during the first three months of transition. 
(Mawby and Harris 2016; OpenDemocracy)
In the above example, the abbreviation EBM itself con-
tains the word based. Consequently, the example contains 
both a pleonastic and a tautological element, with the full 
formula EBM taking up the position normally reserved for 
evidence. The entire framework comes to serve as a substi-
tute for the raw material: in other words, the wording may 
suggest that EBM occupies a singular, unambiguous concep-
tual space. This recalls our discussion of phrasings such as 
the evidence suggests in the previous section. The evidence 
suggests implies access to a fully transparent, univocal data-
set, while the EBM-based approach implies access to a fully 
coherent, set framework, but in both cases the assumption of 
a rigid outline may be evaluated either positively or nega-
tively. The author of the example above favours EBM and 
sees it as a model practice that should guide developments in 
other sectors. At the other end of the spectrum, some critics 
of the model characterise EBM’s rigid univocity as distinctly 
malignant, as the following example illustrates:
“[EBM is not] medicine based on evidence, but the 
equivalent in the field of medicine of a cult with its 
unique dogma, high priest … and fervent disciples,” 
says Dr. John Service, editor-in-chief of Endocrine 
Practice. (Hoofnagle 2007; Denialism)
The critique presented in this quote characterises EBM as 
an oppressive and disciplinary apparatus. Similar critiques 
were raised in other publications, including scholarly jour-
nals, around the same time the Denialism blog post was writ-
ten. Holmes et al. (2006), for instance, argue that a focus on 
EBM “eliminates some ways of knowing”, a process which 
they ultimately describe as “microfascism”. This article too 
is quoted several times in the corpus. Importantly, in the 
quote above the speaker feels the need to unpack what he 
sees as the linguistic dishonesty of EBM by questioning the 
link to evidence as well as based: “[EBM is not] medicine 
based on evidence”. In effect he is suggesting that the verbal 
and the adjectival form of based should essentially express 
the same relation. Yet, in our corpus, the phrase based on 
evidence is largely reserved for unique events, decisions or 
explanations, and only seldom employed with the broad dis-
ciplinary quality of the related adjectival compounds, such 
as evidence-based. Disagreement on the proper application 
of terms such as based is thus at the heart of the argument. 
The quotes from both scholarly publications and more infor-
mal statements by specialists confirm that evidence-based 
medicine has met with strong resistance for over a decade 
now, while at the same time it is still presented as a model 
practice for other sectors to emulate. What some see as help-
ful instructions to guarantee best practice, others interpret 
as undue restrictions, and importantly, based elicits both 
meanings across the corpus, not just in discussions about the 
health sciences. Consider the following examples:
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His book left scope for alternative views of meritoc-
racy including positive associations of merit-based 
systems with social justice. (Gallinat 2018; Discover 
Society)
The corruption of visa work programs might soon 
expand under Trump’s immigration-reform agenda: 
His administration seeks to expand “merit based” 
migration of “high skill” and professional workers, 
while cutting humanitarian and family-reunification 
programs. (Chen 2017; The Nation)
In the first example, based connects a practice to its jus-
tification, while in the second it sceptically connects a prac-
tice to its limitations. The phrases are formally equivalent 
while their evaluative purposes—partially signalled through 
the use of scare quotes—are functionally opposed, as they 
are in different interpretations of evidence-based medicine. 
Thus, researchers seeking to untangle controversies in the 
health sciences may benefit from examining discursive pat-
terns that cut across a broad range of disciplines and fields 
of practice. The continued rejection of the term evidence-
based in the context of healthcare has of course not gone 
unnoticed, and in recent years alternative terms have come 
to circulate widely. The World Health Organization (n.d.), 
for instance, explicitly states that evidence-based implies a 
restricted viewpoint, and that the institution now prefers the 
term evidence-informed. It is not only based that in some 
contexts has fallen into disrepute. In Norwegian, the term 
evidence-based is often translated using kunnskap, usually 
an equivalent of knowledge rather than evidence, in part pre-
cisely to dissociate the discourse from the “positivist con-
notations that are tied to the English expression” (Bondevik 
and Engebretsen 2018). Yet, in all these examples, it is not 
so much the terms evidence or based that independently fall 
out of favour, but rather their specific combination, as the 
following example poignantly illustrates in the choice of dif-
ferent terms in parallel positions:
Ending AIDS requires evidence-informed, rights-
based global leadership (Fried 2016; OpenDemoc-
racy)
Yet are shifts in wording, such as the one from evidence-
based to evidence-informed, indicative of a correspondent 
shift in practice? Positions on the subject will vary, but our 
corpus suggests that while medicine may attract a variety 
of modifiers such as alternative (27 occurrences before 
medicine), conventional (8), modern (8) and real (8), none 
offer rival paradigms to evidence-based. They may refer to a 
competing outlook, but not to a competing set of principles 
and correspondent practices. The rigid view associated with 
EBM thus partly consolidates its continued dominance, at 
least as the standard against which to argue.
Discussion
We began this article with a plea for scholars of the medi-
cal humanities to engage with a new research methodology 
we believe can shed light on important aspects of the evo-
lution and contestation of a core constellation of concepts 
that underpin the practice and ethos of modern medicine. 
While the basic methodology of corpus-based CDA is well 
established in various areas of the social and human sci-
ences, and to a much lesser extent in medicine, we set out to 
demonstrate that combining this methodology with theoreti-
cal assumptions drawn from conceptual history and social 
epistemology provides a powerful framework for elaborating 
an ambitious research agenda. We acknowledge the largely 
non-expert and diverse nature of our corpus and the need to 
supplement it with texts drawn specifically from the field 
of medicine. Our analysis is offered as a preliminary, pilot 
study that prepares the ground for the creation and analy-
sis of large thematic corpora of expert and non-expert dis-
courses on medicine, ranging from scientific papers pub-
lished in journals such as BMJ and The Lancet to official 
WHO and CDC reports, medical textbooks, as well as blog 
posts and Wikipedia articles on medical topics. We hope to 
begin compiling these corpora in 2021, with a view to mak-
ing them and an accompanying software interface available 
to the research community as soon as practicable. Creating 
such new resources can afford us novel insights into some 
of the continued controversies and points of contention in 
the field.
Focusing on one such point of contention, the controversy 
surrounding different interpretations of EBM, we argued, 
firstly, that it is in the nature of evidence as a basic concept 
with wide currency in both specialist and general language 
to support a variety of often conflicting meanings, and there-
fore to continue to invite contestation. We supported our 
argument with an analysis of the lexical patterning of evi-
dence, followed by an analysis of based, the second com-
ponent of EBM and a modifier that may activate a range of 
different, and conflicting associations. Drawing on a large 
corpus of Internet English featuring articles and blogposts 
written by medical practitioners, scientists, journalists and 
activists of various political hues, we unpacked some of the 
many meanings associated with each lexical item, high-
lighting the futility of attempting to impose a single, rigid 
interpretation of what evidence-based means in the context 
of modern medicine. The lexical patterns we identified had 
implications beyond their use in a particular blogpost or by 
a particular medical specialist or layperson. For example, 
one of the patterns we identified across texts and authors is 
there is no evidence of. The same pattern was documented 
decades ago in an early corpus-based study as prevalent in 
medical case reports, more specifically in the context of 
Epistemologies of evidence-based medicine: a plea for corpus-based conceptual research in…
1 3
“eliminating unsubstantiated interpretations of a symptom 
or disease in order to narrow down the potential number 
of causes” (Baker 1988, p. 103). In the context of medical 
journal articles, the phrase concluded a specific investiga-
tion, the steps of which could be systematically traced back 
and verified. By contrast, when used in a polemical blog-
post, the boundaries of the domain covered by a declaration 
that evidence is absent are not always clear, and instead of 
a formulaic statement of academic expression, the phrase 
becomes pre-emptive and axiomatic. This pattern may con-
vey an epistemic sense of certainty, despite no verifiable 
conditions being in place to assess its situated truth value. 
In other words, a speaker’s purpose determines the patterns 
used, but patterns may be exchanged across different com-
municative settings, and thus fulfil different functions in spe-
cific contexts, while nevertheless retaining the semblance 
of a shared argumentative value across all those contexts.
The point is not to suggest that scholarly articles are fun-
damentally more transparent than blogposts in their use of 
evidence, but to elucidate why heated discussion may arise 
around ways of speaking about evidence and other basic 
concepts: when the same means of expression are used to 
discuss different modes of practice, interlocutors’ epistemic 
expectations may be violated. As both specialists and non-
specialists move back and forth across different domains and 
are exposed to different interpretations of a basic concept, it 
is possible that those who reject whole paradigms of knowl-
edge such as EBM may do so because they see them as 
presenting either too rigid or an overly flexible interpretation 
of the concept in question in relation to their own experience 
of its active use in a variety of contexts. Academics and pro-
fessionals concerned with the promotion or contestation of 
medical paradigms therefore cannot ignore existing notions 
of evidence that circulate among different groups in society.
Our analysis also supports some of the basic presuppo-
sitions underpinning the social epistemology approach, as 
outlined in our introduction. First, the lexical patterns we 
identified had implications beyond their use in particular 
communicative settings and across the entire social fabric. 
Considering the nature of evidence as a basic concept, we 
need to draw on a theoretical approach that incorporates 
both scientific and lay processes of conceptualizing and 
evaluating evidence. Second, examining concordance pat-
terns means that individual knowledge becomes secondary 
to discursive manifestations of knowledge as a social, lin-
guistically negotiated endeavour. Third, we have found that 
knowledge claims can rest, as in the case of evidence, on 
attributions of sufficient quality or quantity, but that such 
assessments are always subject to rhetorical techniques 
of persuasion. We have also shown that elements such as 
based, which may appear to be neutral or insignificant, in 
fact express a wide range of divergent relations. Kvernbekk 
(2011, pp. 522–524) has argued that the meaning of based 
may indeed be unclear across various notions of evidence-
based practice. Our analysis has shown that conflicts of 
interpretation may arise between social settings and knowl-
edge domains that alternatively understand the relation 
expressed in evidence-based as one of disciplinary ties, one 
of institutional embedding, one of fundamental principles, or 
one of shared practices and goals. This suggests that a robust 
theory of evidence-based medicine needs to account for the 
values and principles that are specific to the discourse within 
which claims and beliefs about evidence are articulated. As 
also pointed out by other authors (Engebretsen et al. 2016), 
the EBM conception of knowledge fails to acknowledge that 
the way different groups engage in the process of knowing—
as unfolding in specific settings and articulated in different 
types of discourse—determines the principles and objects of 
their knowledge. There is a need for a situated epistemologi-
cal approach to EBM that recognizes and explains different 
types of rationality, and hence plural conceptualizations of 
evidence incorporating various interpretations and nuances 
of meaning that circulate in the everyday linguistic environ-
ment. To develop such a theory will be one of the aims of 
our future research.
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